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ABSTRACT 
Manuscript Type: Review 
Research Question/Issue: This study reviews previous country-level and firm-level studies 
on corporate governance codes up to 2014 in order to highlight recent trends and indicate 
future avenues of research.  
Research Findings/Results: Our data show that research on codes increases over time 
consistently with the diffusion and the relevance of the empirical phenomenon. Despite 
previous studies have substantially enriched our knowledge of the antecedents and the 
consequences of governance codes, our study shows there are still several opportunities for 
making significant contributions in this area.  
Theoretical Implications: Agency theory is the dominant theoretical framework, although 
other theoretical perspectives (especially the institutional one) are increasingly adopted. 
Future studies should be aimed at widening and combining various theoretical lenses so as to 
develop new interpretations and a better understanding of governance codes.  
Practical Implications: Legislators and policy makers should continue to develop and 
update the recommendations of national governance codes in order to address the potential 
failures of corporate governance mechanisms in place.  
Keywords: Corporate Governance, Good Governance Codes, Corporate Governance 
Guidelines. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Since the publication of the Cadbury Code in 1992 there has been a proliferation of corporate 
governance codes and guidelines (hereafter codes). As a result, over the last two decades 
codes have become a popular means of encouraging corporations to increase their 
transparency and accountability (Mallin, 2013). Simultaneously with the worldwide diffusion 
of corporate governance codes, governance scholars have increasingly devoted their attention 
to understand codes‟ characteristics, the rationale behind their diffusion and the implications 
for governance effectiveness and firm performance.  
Despite the increasing attention by governance scholars, a previous review (Aguilera and 
Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009) covering publications on this topic until the middle of 2008 showed 
that there was still 'an apparent lag between advances in the creation of codes and the studies 
analyzing the importance of codes‟ (p.385). To address this lag, the review invited 
governance scholars to extend their studies in several directions, e.g. to provide a more 
careful examination of the codes‟ content, to analyze the effects of the code‟s issuer on its 
content and enforceability, to examine the consequences of codes issued by transnational 
institutions, to analyze the evolution of codes over time, and to explore in more depth the 
relationship between code compliance and firm performance.  
In addition, the recent financial crisis and the related corporate scandals have underlined the 
failure of existing governance mechanisms, including good governance codes. Therefore 
scholars, public opinion and politicians have invited the legislators and the financial 
community to reinforce both regulations (hard law) and governance codes (soft law) in order 
to increase transparency and accountability of, and to restore battered reputations and 
investor confidence in, financial and non-financial companies (e.g. Mallin, 2013; Zattoni and 
Cuomo, 2010). As a consequence, since the first appearance of the global financial crisis in 
2007-08, the number of corporate governance codes increased exponentially over time.  
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Consistent with the growing diffusion of codes and the call for new research on this topic 
(Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009), there has been a proliferation of studies on governance 
codes so that the number of papers published after 2008 is significantly higher than the 
number of papers published before then. After such a recent and intense effort to reform 
corporate governance practices and to investigate the characteristics and the effectiveness of 
corporate governance codes, it is time to undertake a comprehensive review of the 
contribution of such a large flow of studies to the advancement of our understanding of 
codes.  
That being said, the aim of this article is to undertake a review of previous country-level and 
firm-level studies on corporate governance codes in order to take stock of the knowledge 
accumulated and to highlight future avenues of research. This study extends the results of a 
previous review on codes (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009) by significantly increasing 
the number of papers and by expanding the length of the period under investigation. The 
review focuses on more recent phenomena, such as transnational codes, the diffusion of soft 
law, the impact of the global financial crisis on the developments of governance codes and 
the co-existence of hard and soft law. At the same time, the review devotes particular 
attention to more recent studies, i.e. the ones published between 2009 and 2014.  
In order to reach this goal, we first empirically analyze the speed and the path of the 
worldwide diffusion of corporate governance codes issued until the end of 2014. For this 
purpose, we take a wide view of „codes‟, i.e. we analyze formal as well as informal codes, 
including also national and transnational principles and guidelines, e.g. Pan-European, and 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) principles. Then, 
following previous reviews (e.g. Pugliese et al., 2009), we analyze the literature and codify 
previous studies on corporate governance codes using the following criteria: (i) the type of 
articles (i.e. conceptual, empirical), (ii) the theories used (i.e. agency, institutional, other 
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theories, multiple theories), (iii) the research topics (at both country-level and firm-level). In 
addition, only for empirical studies, we consider also: (iv) the research setting (i.e. single 
country or multiple-countries), (v) the data analysis (qualitative, quantitative, mixed methods 
and experiment). Finally, for each paper we identify the major findings. 
The plan of the paper is straightforward. First, we describe the diffusion and the 
characteristics of corporate governance codes around the world. Second, we present the 
method used to select and analyze previous studies on codes and we summarize their 
characteristics. Third, we outline the results of our review of recent country-level and firm-
level studies on corporate governance codes. Then, in the discussion section, we integrate 
previous literature and empirical evidence on corporate governance codes, highlight new 
directions for future research and discuss the main limitations of our review. Finally, we 
present the main conclusions of our study.  
 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODES  
Aims and scope of codes 
Contrary to other forms of regulation (i.e. hard law or hard regulation such as the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002), governance codes (i.e. a form of soft law or soft regulation) are 
"formally nonbinding and voluntary in nature, issued by multi-actor committees, flexible in 
their application, built on the market mechanism for evaluation of deviations and 
evolutionary in nature" (Haxhi and Aguilera, 2014, p.2). They provide a voluntary means for 
innovation and improvement of corporate governance practices as the “comply or explain” 
and the “freedom with accountability” principles form the foundation of their application 
(Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004 and 2009; Mallin, 2013). This means that companies 
have the option to comply with codes‟ recommendations or to explain the reasons why they 
do not comply. The rationale behind these principles is to allow firms some flexibility – i.e. 
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to choose which corporate governance structure to adopt to better pursue their objectives – 
while guaranteeing better transparency to the market.  
Following the dominant agency theory (e.g. Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen and Meckling, 
1976), corporate governance codes encourage the board of directors to play an active and 
independent role in controlling the behavior of top management. Consistent with this view, 
the main codes‟ recommendations on boards suggest increasing the number of non-executive 
and independent directors, the splitting of Chairman and CEO roles, the creation of board 
committees (audit, remuneration, and nomination committees) made up of independent non-
executive directors and several other practices aimed at increasing board accountability and 
effectiveness (see Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009; Zattoni and Cuomo, 2008).   
Corporate governance codes can be designed at three hierarchical levels: international, 
national and individual firm level. First, there are codes issued by transnational institutions 
(such as Pan-European, Commonwealth, OECD, International Corporate Governance 
Network (ICGN)) to promote the diffusion of good governance practices around the world or 
to increase governance standards in a specific geographic region. Second, there are codes 
issued – individually or jointly – by several institutions within individual countries (e.g. the 
stock exchange, the government, and also investors‟, directors', managers' or professional 
associations) with the objective of positively influencing corporate governance practices in 
that specific national environment. Third, there are codes issued by individual firms (such as 
the code issued by General Motors) whose objective is to establish, and to communicate to 
investors and other stakeholders, the governance principles adopted by the firm. 
Regarding national codes, Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra (2004) show that the type of issuer 
differs across and within countries. In addition, they show that the type of institutional 
pressure to adopt codes' recommendations varies with the type of issuer: it is a coercive 
pressure when codes are issued by the stock exchange or investors, a mimetic pressure when 
 This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
codes are issued by a managers' association and a normative pressure when they are issued by 
the remaining types of issuers. 
National and international codes are generally issued for listed companies, although there are 
also codes designed for non-listed companies or even for both listed and non-listed 
companies. More recently, there has also been the issuance of codes designed for companies 
with a specific ownership structure (e.g. state-owned or family-owned), for different types of 
financial institutions (e.g. commercial banks, institutional investors, mutual funds) or for 
voluntary and charitable organizations.  
The disclosure of the compliance with national corporate governance codes differs among 
countries. More precisely, the disclosure on the adoption or explanation can be mandatory 
(i.e. voluntary adoption and mandatory disclosure) or voluntary (i.e. voluntary adoption and 
voluntary disclosure). On the one hand, this mandatory disclosure can be required by the 
listing authority (as, for example, in Australia, Canada, Estonia, Luxembourg, Malta, 
Malaysia, Russia, Singapore and the UK,) or by law (as, for example, in several EU 
countries, including Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain
1
). When the 
disclosure of governance practices is mandatory, the effectiveness of governance codes 
increases, because the external (i.e. market) disciplinary mechanism can work well only with 
informative disclosure on adoption and/or explanation.  
On the other hand, the voluntary adoption and the voluntary disclosure of corporate 
governance practices (that is the standard in some emerging economies – e.g. Algeria, 
Lebanon, Tunisia and Yemen - and even for companies listed on the Alternative Investment 
Market in the UK until August 2014) is less informative and noisier because when the 
company does not disclose its governance practices, investors cannot understand if the 
company does not adopt the best practices or adopts the best practices, but does not disclose 
their adoption. Such lack of disclosure may decrease the effectiveness of governance codes 
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(soft law), because external (i.e. market) disciplinary mechanisms cannot work well without 
informative disclosure on adoption and/or explanation.  
Despite the several positive aspects of the “comply or explain” approach, scholars cast doubts 
on its effectiveness (e.g. Pietrancosta, 2011). First, contrary to hard law regulation, codes 
cannot improve the governance practices of all companies as they leave them free to comply, 
or not, with the requirements of the code. In addition, the empirical evidence also shows that 
when companies comply with codes‟ recommendations, they comply more in form than in 
substance (e.g. Krenn, 2014). As a result, codes can help avoid, or significantly reduce, the 
use of bad governance practices, but they are unable to promote the universal adoption of best 
governance practices (Haxhi and Aguilera, 2014).  
At the same time, hard law regulation also has both positive and negative implications for 
governance practices. Previous studies show, in fact, that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act favored de-
listings and discouraged IPOs in the US due to the increased costs of compliance with 
regulation (Sasseen and Weber, 2006). These costs can be particularly high for some types of 
firms, such as small firms (e.g. Block, 2004; Engel, Hayes and Wang, 2007) and poorly 
performing firms (Leuz, Triantis and Wang, 2008). On the other hand, some recent studies 
show that the benefits of being cross-listed on US stock exchanges continue to exceed the 
costs and that it is more beneficial to be cross-listed in the US than in the UK (Bartlet, 2009; 
Zingales, 2007).  
In sum, it is still too early to judge the efficacy of both the hard law and the soft law 
approaches. First, the effectiveness of these two approaches can vary in different contexts 
(Aguilera, Goyer and Kabbach-Castro, 2013; Pietrancosta, 2011). Second, soft law is 
increasingly seen as a complementary rather than an alternative way to solve corporate 
governance problems (Hopt, 2011). A few recent studies (Carvalho and Pennacchi, 2012; 
Chavez and Silva, 2009) show that Brazil is successfully adopting hybrid versions of these 
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two forms of regulation to overcome the rent seeking action by interest groups opposed to 
reforms. Coherently, scholars call for additional studies on the co-existence of hard and soft 
law regulations in the field of corporate governance (Aguilera et al., 2013).  
 
Diffusion of codes around the world 
We collected information on the speed and the path of the diffusion of governance codes 
around the world up to the end of 2014 in order to update the results of previous studies 
(Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004 and 2009) and to highlight both the role of transnational 
institutions and the impact of the global financial crisis. We took a wide view of codes and 
we built a database of all corporate governance codes including formal as well as informal 
codes, national as well as transnational ones. Our main source of information was the “Codes 
and Principles” section on the European Corporate Governance Institute website 
(http://www.ecgi.org). For reasons of consistency, we excluded laws and legal regulations, 
reports on compliance with codes already issued, initial drafts, consulting firm reports, and 
codes targeting individuals (such as codes of conduct for top managers). Furthermore in order 
to avoid double counting of codes, we included only the final version of each code. 
We classified codes into two groups: transnational and national ones. The first group is 
composed of codes issued by transnational institutions (such as Pan-European, 
Commonwealth, OECD, ICGN) and the second group is composed of codes issued by 
institutions within individual countries. Figure 1 shows that 14 transnational institutions 
issued 21 corporate governance codes by the end of 2014. Corporate governance codes issued 
by transnational institutions diffused very slowly. In particular, the issue of codes started at 
the end of the 1990s, in parallel with the Asian and Russian stock market crashes that 
probably gave impetus to their issue, and accelerated between 2004 and 2006 – a few years 
after the deflation of the internet bubble in 2000 and various high profile corporate scandals 
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including Enron, Worldcom and Parmalat. There was then a second wave immediately after 
the recent financial crisis in 2007-2008.  
- Insert Figure 1 about here -  
Figure 1 also shows that the number of institutions and codes were aligned prior to 2004 as it 
was only after that year that some institutions (i.e. OECD and ICGN) started both to revise 
their codes as a reaction to governance scandals or to issue codes targeted at particular types 
of firms (for example the OECD issued new guidelines for Non-Listed Companies in 
Emerging Markets and for State-Owned Enterprises in 2005). 
Data show that international institutions were more active than all other transnational 
institutions (i.e. Baltic countries, Commonwealth, Latin America and Pan-European) as they 
issued 13 out of 21 codes. In addition, only 3 international institutions out of 14 transnational 
institutions revised or issued new corporate governance codes over time. Amongst 
international institutions, the OECD and the ICGN were the most active as they issued 8 out 
of 21 codes. In particular, the OECD issued its first code in 1999, following the influential 
report “Corporate Governance: Improving Competitiveness and Access to Capital in Global 
Markets” (i.e. “the Millstein Report”). Still in 1999, the ICGN issued its first international 
corporate governance code building on and extending the OECD principles. In the following 
years, the two institutions continued to update and extend their corporate governance codes: 
the OECD in 2004 and more recently in 2015; the ICGN in 2005, 2009 and in 2014.  
Regarding the scope of codes issued by transnational institutions, the vast majority of them 
are designed for all listed companies. However, an increasing number of institutions are also 
issuing governance codes for non-listed firms, for specific types of companies (e.g. state-
owned) and for different types of financial institutions (e.g. institutions offering Islamic 
financial services, microfinance institutions and sovereign wealth funds). 
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Regarding governance codes issued by individual countries, Figure 2 shows that 91 countries 
issued a code and that a total of 345 codes (91 first codes and 254 revisions) have been 
developed around the world by the end of 2014. The Figure also shows that developed 
countries – and especially European ones – play a significant role in the diffusion of codes. 
More precisely, European countries issued more than half of codes issued by all countries 
(i.e. 174 out of 345) and were among the first ones to adopt a code. The first national code 
included in our sample is the Cadbury Code issued in the UK in 1992
2
. From 1992-1998 four 
other EU countries followed the UK example by issuing their first national code: i.e. France 
with the Vienot Report in 1995, the Netherlands with the Peters Report in 1997, Belgium 
with the Cardon Report in 1998, and Spain with the Olivencia Code in 1998.  
In addition, our analysis shows that a smaller number of developed countries issued more 
codes than a larger number of developing countries. In particular, between 1992 and 1998 
only three developing countries issued a code: i.e. South Africa in 1994, India and Thailand 
in 1998. Moreover, developing countries were reluctant to revise their first code as only 30 
out of 53 developing countries issued more than 1 code and only 15 out of 53 issued more 
than 2 codes.  
Insert Figure 2 here 
Table 1 shows that countries vary not only in the speed of adoption, but also in the scope of 
their codes. The vast majority of countries issued codes targeted at all listed companies. 
However, an increasing number of countries also issued governance codes for specific types 
of companies (e.g. state-owned, family-owned, and small and medium enterprises), for 
different types of financial institutions (e.g. commercial banks, institutional investors, mutual 
funds) and for voluntary and charitable organizations. In particular, our data show that, by the 
end of 2014, 9 countries issued 11 codes for specific types of companies such as state-owned 
enterprises (Egypt, Pakistan, the Netherlands and the UK), family-owned enterprises 
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(Colombia, Morocco, Switzerland) and small and medium enterprises (Colombia, France, 
New Zealand and the United Arab Emirates). In addition, there are also some codes 
encouraging institutional investors to play an active role in engaging with boards of directors 
on key issues like governance, strategy and performance. By the end of 2014, 20 countries 
(e.g. Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxemburg, Malaysia, Malta, South Africa and Nigeria) issued 30 
codes targeted at institutional investors or other financial institutions. Their number increased 
significantly after the recent financial crisis 2007-08 and the issuance of the UK Stewardship 
Code (2010, 2012). Finally, it is interesting to note that a few countries (i.e. Australia, 
Canada, the UK and Ireland) also issued a code for voluntary and charitable organizations. 
Insert Table 1 about here 
Figure 2 shows that after the issuance of the Cadbury Code, the diffusion of codes has been 
initially slow and accelerated only after the issuance of both the OECD Principles of 
Corporate Governance and the ICGN Statement on Global Corporate Governance Principles 
in 1999. Only 9 countries around the world issued a corporate governance code by 1997, 
while a further 34 countries joined the group by issuing their first code by 2002. Among 
European countries, the total number of corporate governance codes issued increased after 
the publication of two influential reports (i.e. the European Union Action Plan on 
“Modernising Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the EU” published in 
2003 and the report by the High-Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU published 
in 2009) aimed at furthering the convergence of company law and corporate governance 
practices within the EU.  
Our data show a first peak of new and updated national codes issued in 2002 just after several 
corporate frauds and financial scandals (e.g. Enron, WorldCom, Tyco in the US). 
Interestingly, the development of new corporate governance codes happened in parallel with 
the promulgation of stricter legal norms aimed at increasing investors‟ protection, like the 
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Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the US. A second peak of national codes development (first code and 
revisions) happened between 2009 and 2010, just after the corporate scandals and collapses 
related to the global financial crisis. After 2011, the number of new codes issued per year 
decreased over time – only a few small countries (i.e. Azerbaijan, Barbados, Guernsey and 
the Republic of Maldives) issued their first codes in this period – and the same is true for the 
issuance of revisions and updates of codes, with the exception of the last two years 
considered.  
To sum up, our analysis of the corporate governance codes issued by national countries and 
transnational institutions around the world shows that the number of codes (first issues and 
revisions) increased over time. The most active countries were the developed ones, with the 
UK and the US issuing the greatest number of codes. Moreover, the creation of national 
corporate governance codes usually accelerated after the issuance of influential transnational 
codes and the occurrence of corporate scandals and frauds. Finally, it is interesting to note 
that beyond the traditional codes aimed at addressing corporate governance deficiencies of all 
listed companies, there is an increasing proliferation of codes aimed at improving the 
governance of specific types of companies, of financial institutions and institutional 
investors, and of voluntary and charitable organizations.  
 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODES 
Method 
We undertook a review of previous studies on corporate governance codes around the world 
up to early November 2014 in order to understand what we know and what is still missing. 
Regarding the search criteria, the main databases (i.e. Business Source Complete, Scopus, 
Science Direct and JSTOR) provided by EBSCOhost were used to search for all publications 
(only peer reviewed articles) in English containing the terms “Governance code*” or 
 This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
“Governance guideline*” in their Title/Abstract or Subject terms. We considered all journals 
included in the above mentioned databases.  
Our initial search resulted in 860 articles. Then, after a detailed reading of the abstracts, and 
sometimes also of the content of papers, we excluded papers on other types of codes (for 
example codes of ethics, IT codes, fishery codes), book reviews, duplicates, case studies, 
letters from the editors, papers published by university's journals and student papers. In this 
phase, we also excluded papers focused on different topics or on related topics not relevant to 
our study
3
. This careful analysis enabled us to identify a final sample of 149 articles 
published in 82 journals from 1993 to November 2014.  
Following previous reviews (e.g. Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009; McNulty, Zattoni and 
Douglas, 2013; Pugliese et al., 2009; Zattoni and van Ees, 2012), we did a content analysis of 
the selected papers in order to codify the selected articles using the following criteria: (i) the 
“empirical” or “conceptual” nature of the article, (ii) the theories employed, (iii) the research 
topics. For empirical studies we considered also: (iv) the research setting and (v) the data 
analysis (see Table 2). Regarding the coding scheme and the procedure followed to codify the 
selected articles, three coders initially developed and tested the coding scheme on a sample of 
16 articles. Then, we randomly split the selected articles into two equal sub-samples and we 
assigned them to two different coders to codify them independently. Moreover, a third coder 
codified all of the studies independently. Then, we matched the three sets of data in order to 
measure inter-rater reliability using per cent agreement (Dewey, 1983). We found a high 
overlap as the per cent agreement was equal to 0.94 and to 0.93 respectively and above the 
appropriate minimum level of reliability. Finally, we met to discuss the few cases where there 
was a difference of opinion in order to reach agreement about them.  
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Results 
Following previous reviews (e.g. Saggese, Sarto and Cuccurullo, 2015), we identified the 
most influential articles to illustrate the evolution of previous studies on codes. A common 
view among scholars is that relevant changes in a field of study often happen after the 
publication of influential articles (Bergh, Perry and Hanke, 2006; Kuhn, 2012). Coherently, 
we ranked all 149 articles according to the number of citations on Google Scholar at the end 
of January 2015 (Furrer, Thomas and Goussevskaia, 2008; Saggese et al., 2015). Our search 
shows that the articles published by Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra in 2004 (411 citations), by 
Drobetz, Schillhofer and Zimmermannin 2004 (457 citations) and the previous review by 
Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra in 2009 (189 citations) have been very influential in the 
development of research on corporate governance codes. Consistent with our criteria, we 
identified 2004 and 2009 as the initial years of a new period. Then, following a common 
practice in previous review papers in the field of corporate governance (Pugliese et al., 2009; 
Saggese et al., 2015), we assigned each article to one of the three resulting research periods 
(i.e.1993-2003, 2004-2008 and 2009-2014) according to the year of publication. 
Figure 3 shows that the number of articles on corporate governance codes increased over 
time. Parallel to the slow development of codes, the years after the publication of the first 
paper in our sample (Stiles and Taylor, 1993) – published just one year after the issuance of 
the Cadbury Code in the UK – saw a low interest in the topic. Only 10 out of 149 papers (7 
per cent) were, in fact, published between 1993 and 2003. The number of papers on codes 
increased significantly in the second period, with a total of 58 articles published between 
2004 and 2008. This trend continued in the third period, which includes the majority of the 
papers in our sample, and reached a peak of 20 papers in 2011. 
- Insert Figure 3 about here -  
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Tables 3 summarizes the characteristics of previous studies on corporate governance codes. 
Our results show that the large majority of articles are empirical, while conceptual papers are 
much less common. In addition, our data highlight that the majority of articles on codes are 
not built on an explicit theory or that the theoretical grounding can be found only inductively. 
At the same time, the increasing use of explicit theories over time underlines the maturation 
of the academic debate on the development of good governance codes.  
Several theories from a variety of disciplines (including finance, economics, law, politics, and 
organizational theory) have been used to explore corporate governance phenomena (see for 
example Aguilera and Jackson, 2010; Clarke, 2004; Cohen, Krishnamoorthy and Wright, 
2008). Historically, researchers have mostly focused on governance practices at firm level 
using the agency lens (see for example Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen and Meckling, 1976) 
to study governance issues (e.g. compensation policy, composition of the board of directors, 
CEO duality, relationship between firm governance practices and firm performance, and so 
on). While, on the other hand, they have mostly focused on the role of the national 
institutional environment and its influence on governance practices at country level in order 
to explain differences across countries (see for example Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004; 
Aguilera and Jackson, 2003). More recently, scholars (Aguilera,Filatotchev, Gospel and 
Jackson., 2008; Judge, 2009) suggest using multiple lenses to address governance issues as 
previous studies using a single lens failed to explain governance phenomena.  
Among these several theories, our data indicate that agency theory has affected the 
development of research on codes the most, often as a unique theoretical lens and sometimes 
also in combination with other theories. As codes are developed to address agency issues 
related to the principal-agent problem in widely held companies and to the principal-principal 
problems in companies controlled by large shareholders, agency theory has been used – 
mostly in firm-level studies – as the main theory or as the implicit theoretical background. 
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The second most used theory is institutional theory which has been used both in firm-level 
studies to explain the (legitimation) reasons behind compliance with codes‟ recommendations 
and in country-level studies to explore the (legitimation) reasons behind the diffusion of 
governance codes and to explain diversity in the worldwide diffusion of this practice. Other 
theories (e.g. stakeholder theory, political theory, efficiency theory, stewardship theory, 
contingency theory, conflict and signalling theories, and financial system theory) are rarely 
adopted. This result confirms both the dominance of agency theory and the increasing use of 
institutional theory – alone or in combination with other theories (especially agency) – in the 
explanation and interpretation of governance phenomena (Judge, 2008). 
- Insert Table 3 about here - 
Regarding the research topics
4
, country-level studies are mostly focused on the mechanisms 
for code implementation, on the content of a national code and on the internationalization and 
the convergence-divergence of corporate governance principles. On the other hand, firm-level 
studies are mostly focused on compliance with a national code and on the relationship 
between code compliance and firm performance.While our review of governance codes 
underlines the influence that both some national and transnational codes had on their 
diffusion across countries, it is interesting to note that our review of previous studies shows 
that there is still a relatively scarce number of studies investigating codes at international 
level. 
Regarding the country setting of the empirical studies, Table 4 shows that emerging 
economies are the most common empirical setting, followed by Continental European 
countries and the UK. However, our results vary significantly over the three periods mainly 
due to the different times of the diffusion of codes. In the first period, the UK provides the 
most common setting, due to the importance of the Cadbury Code and the UK experience in 
influencing not only the diffusion of codes, but also the academic debate on governance 
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practices. In the second period, Continental European countries provide the most common 
setting, followed by emerging economies and the UK. In the third period, emerging 
economies provide the most common setting, consistent with the increasing attention of 
governance scholars to governance mechanisms and issues in those countries. As stated 
above, studies on more than one economy are still limited probably due to the difficulties in 
data collection.  
Finally, our analysis on the evolution of the methods shows an increasing number of studies 
with quantitative data analysis and mixed methods. This trend highlights the continuous 
maturation of the empirical research on codes.  
- Insert Table 4 about here - 
 
THE EVOLUTION OF COUNTRY-LEVEL STUDIES ON CODES  
Our review of the existing literature on corporate governance codes shows that a first stream 
of research on this topic consists of country-level studies investigating (i) the mechanisms for 
the implementation of codes, (ii) the reasons behind the adoption of codes, (iii) the content of 
a specific national code, (iv) the comparisons of the content of national codes at international 
level, (v) the internationalization and the convergence-divergence of governance codes, and 
(vi) the consequences of codes issued by transnational institutions. 
 
Studies on the mechanisms for code implementation 
A first set of articles includes studies on the mechanisms for the implementation of codes (i.e. 
mandatory versus voluntary regulation). Our data show that a large number of existing 
studies focused on this topic and that the debate evolved over time and is still alive, 
especially with regard to emerging and transition countries.  
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Several conceptual studies focus on the advantages and disadvantages of the two regulatory 
mechanisms used to solve agency problems and to implement codes (i.e. hard versus soft law 
regulation). In particular, some articles in the first two periods cast doubts on the efficacy of 
the soft law approach, as the lack of monitoring and the weak enforcement reduce its 
effectiveness, and suggest different ways to solve the deficiencies of this approach (see for 
example Cuervo, 2002; Dewing and Russell, 2004). More recently, scholars ask for the use of 
directives and mandatory rules (i.e. hard law) and for the strengthening of institutional 
enforcement mechanisms in transition and emerging economies (Osemeke and Adegbite, 
forthcoming; Wanyama,Burton and Helliar, 2009). In their opinion, in fact, the soft law 
approach is not efficient – i.e. it is useful, but not sufficient – to improve governance 
practices in poor institutional environments, i.e. in countries characterized by weak investors‟ 
rights, poor enforcement of law and undeveloped capital markets. Consistent with this view, 
Wanyama et al. (2009, p. 159) argue that “the mere emergence of detailed governance codes 
in developing countries does not necessarily mean that de facto practices will improve”. 
Moreover, Keay (2014) suggests introducing a regulatory body and some sanctions for non-
compliance or for the failure to adequately explain the reasons for non-compliance. Finally, 
arguing against such emphasis on the hard and soft law mechanisms, some papers (see for 
example Chiu, 2012) focus on the role of institutional investors (i.e. shareholder 
empowerment) as a complementary “market-based” governance mechanism whose 
effectiveness has been reinvigorated by the issuance of the UK Stewardship Code.  
 
Studies on the reasons behind the adoption of codes 
A second set of articles focused on the reasons behind the diffusion of national codes as a 
particular type of best practice. In 2004, the pivotal work of Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra 
(2004) opens up the debate on the reasons behind the adoption of codes. Building on 
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institutional theory, the study aims at investigating if “efficiency” or “legitimation” reasons 
explain the worldwide diffusion of codes. Following this perspective, several studies are 
published in the following years (e.g. Enrione, Mazza and Zerboni, 2006; Zattoni and 
Cuomo, 2008). Their results show that both reasons contribute to explain the diffusion of 
codes around the world. On the one hand, they find that there is a positive association 
between the issuance of codes and country‟s economic integration, government liberalization, 
size of the capital market and the degree of investors‟ protection (Aguilera and Cuervo-
Cazurra, 2004; Zattoni and Cuomo, 2008). On the other hand, they find that civil law 
countries – characterized by lower investors‟ rights than common law countries – are more 
inclined to extend codes‟ recommendations to non-listed companies (Zattoni and Cuomo, 
2008). 
Thereafter the variety of theoretical perspectives increase over time from the efficiency and 
institutional views to the cultural and political ones. For example, Haxhi and van Ees (2010), 
building on Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra (2004) and on Hofstede (2001), show that informal 
institutions (i.e. national culture) matter in the development of corporate governance codes. 
In particular, their results show that individualistic cultures develop more governance codes 
than collectivistic cultures, the stock exchange and investors‟ groups of issuers (i.e. the 
coercive group) are more likely to issue the first code in countries with low power distance 
while the government, directors‟ or professional associations (i.e. the normative group) are 
more likely to issue the first code in countries with high power distance (Haxhi and van Ees, 
2010).  
Finally, a few recent studies building on political theory show that various interests play a 
relevant role in the development of codes. Among them, Haxhi, van Ees and Sorge (2013) 
argue that the issuance of codes in the UK has been affected by the national business elites, 
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while Mosley (2010) argues that political institutions have hindered the diffusion of codes in 
middle-income OECD countries.  
 
Studies on the content of a specific national code  
A third set of articles focused on the analysis of a specific national code. Up to the end of 
2008 these articles (e.g. Cromme, 2005; Fernández, 1999; Roberts, 2004; Webb, Beck and 
McKinnon, 2003) describe the content of the first national code issued in a single country 
(e.g. Germany, UK, Russia and Spain). In more recent years, our results show that studies 
extend their focus in two directions: first, they go beyond the Western European countries‟ 
experience and start to analyze emerging countries‟ codes (e.g. Nigeria, Hungary, Indonesia, 
Malaysia) and, second, they focus on the evolution of the content of national codes in several 
institutional settings (e.g. Martin, 2010 for Hungary; Haxhi et al., 2013 and Nordberg and 
McNulty, 2013 for the UK). For example, a recent article published by Haxhi et al. (2013) on 
the development of corporate governance codes in the UK since the publication of the 
Cadbury Code, shows how good governance practices evolve over time in relation to several 
characteristics of boards of directors, such as board composition and independence, criteria 
for identifying an independent director, board performance evaluation and board sub-
committees‟ composition. Finally, our analysis shows that the issuance of the Stewardship 
Code (2010, 2012) in the UK led to a new avenue of research on the role of institutional 
shareholders (e.g. Chiu, 2012; Reisberg, 2011). 
 
Studies on comparisons of the content of national codes at international level 
Despite the proliferation of codes around the world, our analysis shows that a limited number 
of articles focused on the comparisons of the content of different national codes over time. 
Early articles on this topic are published only after 2004 and their number decreased in the 
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last period. The majority of them analyze and compare the content of codes issued by a small 
number of countries (i.e. between 2 and 7). Regarding the country setting, the EU is the most 
common one as half the articles review the content of codes issued by a number of EU 
countries (e.g. Collier and Zaman, 2005; Hermes, Postma and Zivkov, 2006 and 2007). This 
empirical emphasis is consistent with the increasing political pressure of the EU to harmonize 
several elements of regulation across European countries, including corporate law and 
governance codes.  
Despite the increasing pressure coming from institutional investors and supra-national 
organizations to homogenize codes‟ content, studies using a large international sample (see 
for example Heugens and Otten, 2007; Zattoni and Cuomo, 2008) are very uncommon and 
are published only after 2007. Among them, Zattoni and Cuomo (2008), by analyzing the 
content of codes issued in 60 countries around the world, find that the codes‟ content varies 
across countries (i.e. civil law countries issue codes with less stringent and rigid 
recommendations than common law countries). Studies on this topic also remain very limited 
in the third period. Among them, Cicon, Ferris, Kammel and Noronha (2012) find that the 
difference and changes across 23 European countries are explained by both the strength of the 
legal protection and the type of issuer. Coherently, Zattoni and Cuomo (2010) find that the 
definition of independent directors differs across 44 international countries and that the 
country origin legal system only partially explains these differences.  
Finally, regarding the methods, it is interesting to note that less than one quarter (i.e. 4 out of 
15) of the empirical studies on this topic use quantitative or mixed methods (Cicon et al., 
2012; Hermes et al.2007; Zattoni and Cuomo, 2008 and 2010) and only one is based on a 
longitudinal sample (i.e. Cicon et al., 2012). 
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Studies on the internationalization and the convergence-divergence of corporate 
governance codes 
Another set of articles in this line of research focused on the reflections on the 
internationalization and the convergence-divergence of corporate governance principles. The 
first studies on the codes‟ internationalization are published only recently, i.e. after 2004. 
Despite the strong pressure for convergence toward the Anglo-American corporate 
governance model, these studies show that divergence prevails around the world and that the 
content of codes is not converging either in European or in emerging countries (e.g. Collier 
and Zaman, 2005; Hermes et al., 2006; Roberts, 2004; Zattoni and Cuomo, 2008). Several 
recent studies focused on this topic confirm that divergence prevails around the world (e.g. 
Böhm, Bollen and Hassink, 2013; Cicon et al., 2012; Davies and Hopt, 2013; Johanson and 
Østergren, 2010; Zattoni and Cuomo, 2010). Overall, these results support the limited 
convergence of the different corporate governance systems toward the Anglo-American 
governance model (see Aguilera and Jackson, 2010 for a recent review). 
 
Studies on the consequences of codes issued by transnational institutions 
Finally, there are studies focused on the consequences of codes issued by transnational 
institutions. Governance scholars argue that transnational codes have undoubtedly had a key 
influence on the development of national corporate governance codes around the world 
(Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009; Mallin, 2013; Reid, 2003). The empirical evidence 
show, in fact, that the key recommendations advanced by codes issued by transnational 
organizations have been incorporated in many national codes (for example in Greece, China, 
Czech Republic, Egypt, Hungary) and that international organizations (like the World Bank, 
the OECD and the International Monetary Fund) promoted and assessed the implementation 
of these codes around the world.  
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Despite the importance of this topic, our data show that academic research is still limited. In 
particular, only a few empirical articles assess the extent to which the principles and the 
recommendations of these transnational codes have been incorporated in the content of 
corporate governance codes around the world. Regarding the empirical articles, the EU is the 
leading geographical setting as most of the articles review the content of codes issued by a 
relatively small number of European countries in order to analyze the codes‟ coverage of EU 
company law directives (e.g. Böhm et al. 2013; Hermes et al., 2007; Soltani and Maupetit, 
2015). Their findings show that European countries deviate substantially from the EU 
recommendations and that the rate of coverage of each recommendation differs across 
countries.  
 
THE EVOLUTION OF FIRM-LEVEL STUDIES ON CODES 
A second stream of research on corporate governance codes consists of firm-level studies 
investigating (i) compliance statements at national level, (ii) compliance statements at 
international level, (iii) explanations for deviations from a corporate governance code, and 
(iv) the relationship between code compliance and firm performance. 
 
Studies on compliance statements at national level 
A first group of firm-level studies includes surveys of compliance statements at national level 
exploring if, and how, national companies tend to comply with codes‟ recommendations. Our 
data show that the literature on this topic is very extensive. In particular, comparative 
analyses of governance practices before and after the introduction of a code show the positive 
effect of codes on the evolution of corporate governance practices (e.g. Chen and Nowland, 
2011; Conyon, 1994; Jones, Li and Cannella, 2015; Peasnell, Pope and Young, 2000; Stiles 
and Taylor, 1993). Companies tend to comply with codes‟ recommendations for several 
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reasons, mostly for increasing their legitimation among investors and improving the 
effectiveness of their governance practices (Zattoni and Cuomo, 2008).  
In addition, previous studies show that several factors can influence the rate of compliance 
with codes‟ recommendations. For example, a number of studies find that firm size is a 
powerful driver of firm compliance. This relationship has been supported in several countries, 
like the UK (Conyon and Mallin, 1997), Germany (von Werder, Talaulicar and Kolat, 2005), 
and the Netherlands (Akkermans et al., 2007). The main explanations behind this evidence 
are that the costs of compliance grow more than proportionally with firm size, larger 
companies need more sophisticated governance practices, and the pressure to comply is 
higher for larger companies as their ownership structure is more dispersed and they are under 
more scrutiny from the external environment.  
Furthermore, previous studies find that the extent of compliance with codes‟ 
recommendations and the level of detail of the information disclosed on corporate 
governance increase over time (Akkermans et al., 2007; MacNeil and Li, 2006; O‟Shea, 
2005; Price, Román and Rountree, 2011). So a second factor explaining firm compliance is 
increasing market pressure over time.  
The level of compliance varies across codes‟ recommendations, as some of the more 
controversial recommendations are associated with a higher level of non-compliance. For 
example, studies on the German Corporate Governance Code find a lower level of 
compliance with some critical recommendations, such as personal liability and compensation 
of management and/or of supervisory board members (see for example Andres and Theissen, 
2008; Chizema, 2008). So a third factor affecting the compliance is the overall institutional 
environment, including both the legal norms and the cultural values. In addition, the presence 
of a multiplicity of corporate governance codes and of potential conflicts among their 
recommendations can allow firms to comply with a limited and strategically selected number 
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of items (see the empirical evidence on Nigerian firms collected by Osemeke and Adegbite, 
forthcoming). Finally, further studies show that the level of compliance with codes varies 
significantly across countries: being higher in developed countries – like the UK (Conyon 
and Mallin, 1997), Italy (Bianchi, Ciavarella, Novembre and Signoretti, 2011) and Germany 
(von Werder et al., 2005) – and lower in less developed countries that lack a tradition of 
sound corporate governance – e.g. Cyprus (Krambia-Kapardis and Psaros, 2006). So another 
variable of importance is the development of the national economy. 
 
Studies on compliance statements at international level 
A second set of articles along this line of research includes surveys of compliance statements 
at international level, investigating if, and how, there are significant differences in the 
compliance of firms located in different countries.  
Among them, Nowland (2008) analyzing data for several East Asian countries (i.e. Hong 
Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand) finds 
that the level of compliance of small and family-owned firms is lower than the level of 
compliance of firms with larger size and more dispersed ownership. Furthermore, Florou and 
Galarniotis (2007), in an empirical study aimed at comparing the governance practices of 
Greek firms with three governance standards characterized by different strictness of their 
recommendations (i.e. low, the Greek law; medium, the Greek Code; and high, the UK 
Combined Code), show that the average rating of compliance is very low and largely 
decreases for more stringent standards. More recently, Salterio, Conrad and Schmidt (2013), 
in an empirical study on Canadian and Australian listed companies, show that companies in 
the two countries adhere to the “comply or explain” principle differently. In more detail, 
compliance in terms of adoption of best practices is more common in Canada, whereas 
compliance in terms of either adoption or explanation is more common in Australia. In 
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addition, the study shows that the companies in the two countries comply with different sets 
of recommendations. As Canada and Australia can be considered broadly similar countries, 
this study encourages governance scholars to analyze firm compliance behavior across 
countries more extensively. 
 
Studies on deviations from a corporate governance code 
A further set of articles includes searches on the explanations for deviations from codes‟ 
recommendations. The limited existing literature on this topic shows that smaller firms tend 
to have a lower level of compliance with codes‟ recommendations than larger firms (e.g. 
Talaulicar and von Werder, 2008 for Germany; Hooghiemstra and van Ees, 2011 for the 
Netherlands; Arcot, Bruno and Faure-Grimaud, 2010 for the UK). In addition, they find that 
family-owned firms are less likely to comply with voluntary recommendations than non-
family firms (e.g. Arcot et al., 2010 for the UK; Zeidan, 2014 for Brazil).  
More recently, the few studies on this topic have also started to explore the quality and type 
of explanations for non-compliance and whether some firms‟ characteristics contribute to 
explain their choice to provide more or less informative explanations. A study by Arcot el. 
(2010) finds that both widely held and family-owned non-financial UK companies are more 
likely to use standard explanations for deviations from compliance. Furthermore, recent 
studies in the Netherlands find that Dutch firms with concentrated ownership structure, a 
larger number of analysts following them and stronger boards are more likely to provide 
more informative explanations (Hooghiemstra, 2012). Moreover, empirical evidence suggests 
that firms complying with the same recommendations are more likely to use similar 
explanations for non-compliance (Hooghiemstra and van Ees, 2011).  
Seidl, Sanderson and Roberts (2013) analyze the application of the „comply or explain‟ 
principle by the 130 largest companies in Germany and the UK and find that non-compliance 
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is not uncommon both in Germany and in the UK. Following institutional theory, they also 
empirically derive a “taxonomy for explanations” (p.803). More recently, Shrives and 
Brennan (2014) expand Seidl et al.‟s (2013) study by developing six criteria to analyze the 
explanations for non-compliance used by UK FTSE companies. Their study underlines that 
the level of compliance increases over time, but the quality of explanations for non-
compliance remains very low and presents only marginal improvements. Furthermore, they 
show that some differences exist between non-compliance explanations for FTSE100 and 
FTSE250 companies. Finally, regarding the research setting, our review shows that the 
majority of articles focus on a single country and refer mostly to a limited number of 
European economies (i.e. Germany, the Netherlands and the UK). 
 
Studies on the relationship between code compliance and firm performance 
A further set of articles within this line of research consists of studies on the relationship 
between code compliance and firm performance. Our review shows that a limited number of 
studies have explored this topic over time. Regarding the research setting, our review shows 
that the majority of articles focus on a single country and that only two cross-country studies 
have been published until now on this topic (i.e. Nowland, 2008; Renders, Gaeremynck and 
Sercu, 2010). In addition, while early studies focus on UK companies, more and more studies 
are developed with regard to emerging economies.    
Despite considerable research effort, the empirical findings from a number of studies on 
several countries around the world are mixed and inconclusive as to whether a higher level of 
code compliance enhances firm performance, even though several measures for performance 
have been used and scholars have significantly improved the methodology over time. In 
particular, some studies find that higher code compliance enhances firm performance (e.g. 
Del Brio,  Maria-Ramires and Perote , 2006 and Fernández-Rodríguez, Gómez-Ansón and 
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Cuervo-García, 2004 for Spain; Luo and Salterio, 2014 for Canada; Machuga and Teitel, 
2007 for Mexico; Nowland, 2008 for seven East-Asian countries and Renders et al., 2010 for 
14 European countries) or that the stock markets appreciate firm compliance (e.g. Goncharov 
Werner and Zimmermann, 2006 and Chavez and Silva, 2009 for Germany and Brazil). 
Contrary to the previous ones, some studies find no association (e.g. Haniffa and Hudaib, 
2006 for Malaysia; Price et al., 2011 for Mexico) or provide mixed results (e.g.McKnight and 
Weir, 2009 and Weir, Laing and McKnight, 2002 for the UK) on the relationship between 
codes‟ compliance and firm performance.  
An extensive debate exists on the reasons that might explain the lack of conclusive findings 
on the relationship between firm compliance with good governance codes and performance. 
In particular, the mixed results of previous studies seem to be due to both conceptual and 
methodological issues. Among the conceptual ones, previous studies did not adequately 
explore the role of the national institutional environment whilst recent studies find that it can 
have a significant impact on this relationship. For example, Renders et al. (2010) argue that 
codes‟ content (i.e. the definition of independent directors and, in general, the strictness of 
their recommendations) and national institutional environment (e.g. the level of corruption, 
the quality of law enforcement, the strength of investors‟ protection, and the cultural and 
political environments) may significantly affect this relationship.  
With regard to the methods employed, scholars have highlighted a number of limitations of 
previous studies, including: (i) the lack of control for firm‟s specific characteristics (such as 
firm leverage, size, type of owners, presence of institutional investors); (ii) the use of OLS 
regression and the lack of control for endogeneity and selection bias (see Weir et al., 2002; 
Renders et al., 2010), (iii) the use of proxies to measure good governance (i.e. governance 
index), shareholder protection (e.g. the “anti-director rights index” developed by La Porta et 
al., 1998) and firm performance (e.g. book or market value) (e.g. Aguilera and Desender, 
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2012; Renders et al., 2010). Therefore future studies should also try to address all these 
deficiencies from a methodological point of view. 
 
DISCUSSION  
The recent global financial crisis reinvigorated the debate on good governance practices and 
consequently stimulated a further wave of new codes or the revision of existing codes. As a 
consequence, the number of studies on codes published after 2008 is larger than the number 
of studies published previously. This growing interest in codes shows that the academic 
debate is still hot and will probably also be lively in the coming years especially after recent 
scandals such as Petrobras in Brazil, Deutsche Bank,Volkswagen in Germany and Toshiba in 
Japan. The 2015 G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance are also likely to give 
further impetus to the debate on corporate governance practices around the world.  
Our results show that recent research on codes is evolving in its sophistication. While agency 
theory is still the dominant framework, other theoretical perspectives (especially institutional 
theory) are gaining ground as well as multi-theory studies. In terms of geographical settings, 
the majority of recent studies explore governance codes in transition and emerging 
economies, while research on the UK and Continental European countries still persists. 
Finally, empirical papers explore a wide set of research questions using different research 
methods including mixed methods and experiments.  
Our analysis of publications on good governance codes up to the end of 2014 indicates that 
some of the gaps highlighted by a previous review on codes (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 
2009) have been appropriately, or at least partly, addressed. First, recent studies have started 
both to investigate how codes change over time (Johanson and Ostergren, 2010; Nordberg 
and McNulty, 2013) and to explore the role of institutional actors and the business elite in the 
code-issuing political process (Haxhi et al., 2013). Second, some recent works have explored 
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the impact of formal and informal institutions (including cultural variables) on the issuance of 
codes and on the types of issuer in different countries (Haxhi and van Ees, 2010). Third, 
some studies have contributed to enrich the comparative analysis of the codes‟ content (Cicon 
et al., 2012) and have devoted attention to analyze the differences in the definition of 
directors‟ independence across national codes (Zattoni and Cuomo, 2010). Fourth, recent 
studies have started to investigate the consequences of codes issued by transnational 
institutions in the EU (Böhm et al., 2013; Cicon et al., 2012). Finally, some papers have 
investigated how firm compliance/non-compliance evolves over time (Arcot et al. 2010; 
Chen and Nowland, 2011) and have provided a richer empirical evidence on the explanations 
for deviations from a corporate governance code (Hooghiemstra, 2012; Shrives and Brennan, 
2014).  
Despite recent studies having significantly contributed to advance our knowledge on good 
governance codes, research on this topic is still full of interesting opportunities for further 
exploration. Based on our extensive review of previous studies, in the next pages we provide 
a roadmap for future research on codes at country-level and firm level respectively. 
 
Country-level studies on codes 
An interesting way to extend previous country-level studies is to further analyze how codes 
diffuse, evolve and adapt over time. Institutional theory seems to be a promising theoretical 
lens to address this objective (e.g. DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Based on this theory, few 
practices, if any, come out of the diffusion process unchanged as an adopter strives to create a 
better fit between an external practice and the need to increase its “zone of acceptance” 
during implementation (Lewis and Seibold, 1993). Consistent with this view, some studies 
suggest that the diffusion of a practice is a dynamic process, and that diffusing practices may 
be modified or “adapted” by adopters (Ansari, Fiss and Zajac, 2010; Fiss, Kennedy and 
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Davis, 2012). So, following institutional theory, governance scholars could explore patterns 
of practice variation in the diffusion of governance codes across time and countries, for 
example to understand if early and late adopters follow different rationales as in the diffusion 
of other contested practices (Fiss and Zajac, 2004). 
A second topic that may deserve further attention by governance scholars is the consequence 
of codes issued by transnational organizations. Despite the fact that these codes could have 
significantly influenced the diffusion and the content of national codes, a limited number of 
studies explore this issue and mostly with regard to the EU experience (Böhm et al., 2013; 
Soltani and Maupetit, 2015). So future studies could, for example, explore to what extent the 
codes issued by influential transnational organizations have affected the issue, the revision 
and the content of national codes. This research would facilitate the development of a better 
understanding of the links between the governance debate at the international and at the 
national level.   
Moreover, further studies could focus on the process of codes‟ development. On this issue it 
would be important to get a better understanding of which subjects play an influential role on 
codes‟ development, which interests shape their content, and which parties are interested or 
not in their proper implementation (e.g. Haxhi et al., 2013; Nordberg and McNulty, 2013). 
Future studies could, for example, analyze the political process leading to the development of 
codes and shaping their content, in order to better understand the role of institutional 
investors, directors‟ associations, large shareholders, government authorities and other 
parties. Finally, the extension of studies beyond the UK can help scholars to develop a more 
contextualized view of the political process leading to the development of codes and to their 
implementation. The issuance of the revised OECD Code in 2015 and the various comments 
received on the preliminary draft, could also be an area worth exploring. 
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Furthermore, our results show a growing diffusion of codes targeted at specific types of 
companies, e.g. family- or state-owned companies. So an additional topic that can be further 
investigated is the development of codes relevant to firms with specific characteristics (i.e. 
ownership structure, size or industry). This recent phenomenon is based on the idea that these 
types of companies have a significant impact on national economies (think, for example, of 
the relevance of state-owned companies in some emerging economies like China, Brazil and 
Russia) and that good governance practices can increase their accountability and 
performance. As such, future studies should explore both the soundness of the conceptual 
reasons behind the issue of these specific codes (e.g. do we need further codes if good 
governance codes are flexible in their nature?), and their effectiveness in improving the 
governance practices of targeted companies (e.g. their impact on firm adoption and 
performance).  
Finally, we believe that the extension of studies on the co-existence of hard and soft law is 
crucial to the better understanding of this topic. The debate about the efficacy of both hard 
and soft law mechanisms in solving agency problems is still open. Recent studies show that 
soft law does not solve governance issues in poor institutional environments (Wanyama et al., 
2009) and advance the idea that more regulation (e.g. better rules or the introduction of 
regulatory bodies) are necessary to improve governance practices (Chiu, 2012; Keay, 2014). 
Based on these findings, future studies should try to better explore the effects of the 
interaction between codes‟ recommendations and the quality of the institutional environment 
on governance practices and effectiveness. The careful consideration of the national (formal 
and informal) institutional context can be crucial for the development of a better 
understanding of these issues (e.g. Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004; Haxhi and van Ees, 
2010; Zattoni and Cuomo, 2008).  
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Firm-level studies on codes 
A first topic that seems to be worthy of further exploration is the understanding of the reasons 
behind compliance and deviations from good governance codes‟ recommendations. 
Governance codes have been conceived as flexible tools to promote the diffusion of best 
practices, e.g. they leave companies the possibility to deviate from their recommendations if 
this allows them to design the most appropriate corporate governance in light of their specific 
characteristics. Future studies are invited to collect more empirical evidence on the reasons 
(e.g. spillover or contagion effect) behind compliance and non-compliance (e.g. Salterio et 
al., 2013), and on the type and quality of explanations provided to justify deviations from 
codes‟ recommendations (Seidl et al., 2013; Shrives and Brennan, 2014). 
A second topic that may be usefully investigated by governance scholars is the interaction 
between board best practices – as proposed by national codes – and the configuration of other 
governance mechanisms. A relatively unexplored perspective in corporate governance 
suggests that governance mechanisms interact amongst themselves, creating substitution and 
complementarity effects (e.g. Rediker and Seth, 1995; Ward, Brown and Rodriguez, 2009). 
Following this view, the understanding of the effectiveness of governance best practices 
requires that scholars go beyond the analysis of a single mechanism and consider all 
mechanisms at the same time. While this approach can enrich the understanding of the 
reasons behind deviations and explanations of non-compliance, it may also provide avenues 
of research in other directions. This view questions, for example, the possibility of 
developing universal governance indexes or best practices, or at least invites scholars and 
practitioners to think in term of bundles of governance practices (García -Castro, Aguilera 
and Ariño, 2013; Schiehll, Ahmadjian and Filatotchev, 2014). Furthermore, additional studies 
can analyze the role of some key firm variables (e.g. the identity of the major shareholder or 
 This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
the capital structure of the firm) in affecting the relationship between code compliance and 
firm performance.  
Finally, another line of investigation involves the collection of international samples 
combining data about national institutional variables and firm governance variables (e.g. 
Kumar and Zattoni, 2013). This further avenue of research can contribute to addressing the 
long lasting question of convergence and divergence of governance practices. Recent 
publications show, in fact, that national economies and governance models continue to differ 
and that pressure to converge does not automatically produce the diffusion of the Anglo-
American practices everywhere (e.g. Zattoni and Cuomo, 2008; Zattoni and Judge, 2012).  
 
Limitations 
Our literature review has some limitations. First, following previous review papers in the 
field of corporate governance (Pugliese et al., 2009; Saggese et al. 2015), we selected and 
analyzed only peer-reviewed articles in English. As such, other types of publications on this 
topic have not been included in our review (e.g. academic books like van den Berghe, 2002 
or consultancy reports like Gregory and Simmelkjaer, 2002). So, future studies could include 
also other types of publications or explore if, and how, they have contributed to the 
development of our knowledge on governance codes. 
Second, we excluded papers focused on the impact of code compliance on the effectiveness 
and efficiency of firm operation (e.g. internal control) and the quality of information 
disclosure (e.g. financial accounting information). So, future studies could enrich our review 
by analyzing some related areas of research like the two mentioned before. 
Third, we assigned previous studies on codes to three research periods based on the year of 
journal publication of very influential articles. We acknowledge that assigning papers based 
on the year of publication is a crude proxy as it could take some years before a paper is 
 This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
published and because publication date and sample period are not necessarily linked. At the 
same time, the year of publication is when the article receives most exposure and influences 
subsequent work in the area. Then, this criterion allowed us to classify also conceptual papers 
with no empirical data collection. Therefore, whilst we recognize the crude nature of the 
proxy, we believe that the year of publication is the most appropriate criterion for this study. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Our review contributes to corporate governance research by both analyzing the diffusion of 
governance codes, and reviewing all previous studies on codes. Our study underlines the 
increasing importance of governance codes and the key role of supranational institutions and 
corporate frauds in stimulating their worldwide diffusion and revision. In addition, it 
describes key theoretical and methodological trends in recent research on codes. Our findings 
provide a roadmap for future research on codes both at country-level and firm-level.  
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FIGURE 1: The diffusion of transnational corporate governance codes around the 
world (1992-2014) 
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FIGURE 2: The diffusion of national corporate governance codes around the world 
(1992-2014) 
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FIGURE 3: The evolution of research on corporate governance codes (1992-2014)
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